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INTRODUCTORY HYPOTHETICAL 
Imagine for a moment the following situation. There is a young couple, newly 
married and eager to start a family. Both spouses had been working, but the wife 
has resigned from her job to give the baby complete attention. The couple decides 
that it will endure this pay cut, for the promise of upcoming life and a loving home 
life for their child is well worth the sacrifice. The couple arrives at the hospital for 
what should be one of the most memorable and special days of their lives. All is 
going as planned, and as the moment of delivery approaches, the excitement 
continues to grow. Surrounded by their families, the couple begins to realize that 
this will be even better than they expected. Then the unthinkable happens. 
Through a tragic accident of nature, and despite world-class medical care, the 
baby dies just hours after delivery. What should have been the best day of their 
lives has now become the worst. As the couple begins to grapple with the fact that 
they will be childless, little do they realize that their losses are just beginning. 
The hospital staff requests permission to perform an autopsy on the body. 
While this request seems simple enough, the couple politely declines, wishing only 
to bury the baby and begin healing from the tragic situation. The nursing staff 
continues pestering the couple to consent to an autopsy, citing the benefits that 
would accrue to science. The couple finally relents, but on the specific condition 
that the autopsy be limited to only the baby’s colon, which is believed to be the 
origin of the complications. The couple knows that even a limited autopsy will 
provide research that may benefit other families, and they can offer these benefits 
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while preserving the sanctity of the remainder of the body. Yet despite the explicit 
instructions, the hospital staff performs an autopsy on the entire body. After the 
parents find out, they are further devastated. Not only have their wishes been 
ignored, but the body of their first child has been violated too. Without even an 
apology, the couple is sent home. 
Unfortunately for this hypothetical couple, the current state of Pennsylvania 
law on the subject of abuse of a corpse consists of two absolute extremes: Full 
recovery may be had for abuse that rises to the outrageous and wanton level, but 
zero recovery may be had for conduct at the negligence level. Pennsylvania should 
adopt the most recent version of § 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
open the door to recovery for negligent abuse; this approach would eliminate the 
weaknesses in the current categorical approach, bring Pennsylvania into conformity 
with other states, and make post-mortem rights consistent with other areas of tort 
law. 
This note will begin with an overview of the current state of Pennsylvania law 
(I), which does not allow recovery for negligent abuse of a corpse. This overview 
will discuss two categories of conduct: outrageous conduct for which recovery may 
be had (I-A) and a spectrum of negligent conduct for which the door to recovery is 
closed (I-B). The note will then argue for a change in Pennsylvania law by 
comparing Pennsylvania to other states that do allow for recovery (II-A), 
discussing the ramifications of assessing damages (II-B), criticizing the current 
rationale for denying recovery (II-C), and discussing the unfortunate formation of a 
“reverse eggshell skull rule” in tort law (II-D). 
I. PENNSYLVANIA DOES NOT ALLOW RECOVERY FOR 
NEGLIGENT ABUSE 
Calling it an admittedly “difficult and disturbing decision to make,”1 
Pennsylvania courts have not yet recognized a cause of action for “negligent abuse 
of a corpse.”2 That is, mere negligent mishandling of a corpse, absent intentional or 
wanton conduct, does not currently constitute a cause of action under Pennsylvania 
law.3 Pennsylvania courts have used a two-category test on the subject of abuse of 
a corpse: In the category of intentional or outrageous abuse, recovery may be had, 
but in the category of mere negligent abuse, recovery is barred. 
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A. Intentional/Outrageous Category 
Lying within the first category of intentional abuse is the case of Papieves v. 
Lawrence, in which a fourteen-year-old boy was struck by a car and killed.4 The 
driver did not seek medical assistance, nor did he notify the boy’s parents.5 Instead, 
the driver took the body to his garage, where he stored it for a few days until 
burying it in a nearby field.6 More than two months later, the remains were 
unearthed and returned to the boy’s parents, who sued the driver for mishandling of 
the body.7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the issue of the existence of 
a cause of action for mishandling the dead had never been presented to an appellate 
court before.8 The court explained that, while some jurisdictions treat a corpse as a 
quasi-property right of the heirs, “the underlying, and we believe real, issue is the 
right of a decedent’s nearest relatives to protection against intentional, outrageous 
or wanton conduct which is peculiarly calculated to cause them serious mental or 
emotional distress.”9 
The court cautioned that all citizens’ peace of mind cannot be universally 
guaranteed, and in some instances, a “toughening of the mental hide is a better 
protection than the law could ever be.”10 Yet the court determined that the 
plaintiffs’ situation warranted recovery, for “[t]here can be little doubt that mental 
or emotional disorders brought on by conduct such as that set forth in the complaint 
at bar may be every bit as real, every bit as debilitating as ailments which have 
more obviou[s] physical causes.”11 Because damages arising from abuse of a 
corpse are more difficult to calculate than other tangible, physical injuries, the court 
held that such difficulty is not a reason to deny recovery entirely.12 
The Papieves court also discussed other issues, including the “impact rule,” 
which bars recovery for emotional distress arising out of one’s negligent conduct 
unless the victim is physically impacted or suffers some physical injury from the 
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negligent conduct.13 The court noted that the “impact rule” was entirely 
inapplicable and thus not a bar to recovery in this case, for the conduct at hand 
involved intentional misconduct.14 The court also noted that it was irrelevant that 
there can be no direct recovery for emotional distress in a wrongful death claim, for 
to bar recovery in this situation “would have us ignore precisely that aspect of the 
defendants’ alleged conduct which renders it tortious—its intentional and wanton 
character—and the extraordinary mental distress which is attributable to that 
conduct.”15 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Papieves by expressly adopting 
§ 868 of the first Restatement of Torts, which states “[a] person who wantonly 
mistreats the body of a dead person or who without privilege intentionally removes, 
withholds or operates upon the dead body is liable to the member of the family of 
such person who is entitled to the disposition of the body.”16 The court held that 
“recovery may be had for serious mental or emotional distress directly caused by 
the intentional and wanton acts of mishandling a decedent’s body . . . .”17 
B. Negligence Category: Establishment of a Negligence 
Spectrum 
While Papieves involved the “intentional” category of abuse, the majority of 
this paper will focus on the latter category of abuse—that which lies entirely within 
the negligence realm and within which no recovery may be had.18 It is true that 
there are no “degrees of negligence” in Pennsylvania.19 But under the broad 
umbrella of negligent conduct, there is a three-part spectrum, such that some types 
of negligence are more egregious than other types of negligence, even though they 
are defined identically as negligence. It is the exploration of this spectrum of 
negligent conduct which illuminates the weaknesses in Pennsylvania law, for no 
conduct lying at any location along this vast spectrum is actionable because none of 
it rises to the intentional/outrageous level mandated by Papieves.20 The weakness 
                                                           
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 122. 
16 Id. at 119–20 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 868 (1939)). 
17 Id. at 121. 
18 See Hackett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
19 Ferrick Excavating & Grading Co. v. Senger Trucking Co., 484 A.2d 744, 749 (Pa. 1984). 
20 Papieves, 263 A.2d at 122. 
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in this approach is that the door to recovery is completely closed, regardless of the 
level of egregiousness underpinning such negligent conduct. While this might 
properly bar recovery for slight negligence, the current approach fails to consider 
that there are more egregious types of negligent conduct that are not actionable 
under this “all or nothing” approach. This prevents a victim from recovering 
anything, even though his actual damages would always be proportionate with the 
level of the tortfeasor’s negligence. 
1. Negligence Spectrum: Low Level of Culpability 
At the low level of culpability in the negligence spectrum is the case of 
Hackett v. United Airlines, in which the plaintiff contracted with a funeral director 
to provide an adequate casket to protect the body of the plaintiff’s decedent when 
transported across the country, where there would be a proper burial.21 The funeral 
director assured the plaintiff that a bronze casket would provide adequate 
protection for the decedent’s body during transport, as opposed to an alternative, 
such as a shipping crate.22 Based on this representation, the plaintiff purchased the 
bronze casket and shipped the body across the country on United Airlines.23 Upon 
arrival, the plaintiff discovered that the casket had been badly damaged during the 
flight, and there was also damage to the body inside.24 The casket’s damaged 
condition was evident during the funeral proceedings, and the plaintiff suffered 
severe mental anguish that required medical treatment.25 
In a lawsuit against the funeral director and airline, the appellate court found 
that the plaintiff had not set forth a cause of action.26 The plaintiff relied on a 1977 
revision to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 868, which states, “One who 
intentionally, recklessly or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates 
upon the body of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is 
subject to liability to a member of the family of the [decedent] who is entitled to the 
disposition of the body.”27 The Superior Court noted that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had not yet adopted the 1977 revision to § 868 of the Restatement, 
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23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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26 Id. at 975. 
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and the prior holding in Papieves had limited recovery to instances where there was 
intentional, outrageous, or wanton behavior towards a corpse.28 The court noted, 
“There is no indication whatsoever . . . that the Court intended to blanketly sanction 
any extension of the provided cause of action in accordance with future revisions 
of, or additions to, Section 868 in later Restatements.”29 Thus, the court held that 
negligently providing an inadequate casket, which subsequently caused harm to the 
decedent, was not actionable because the defendants’ conduct did not rise to the 
level of intentional or wanton misconduct.30 
Returning to our hypothetical involving the hospital-autopsy situation, a slight 
twist on its facts could produce a situation at the low level of culpability on the 
negligence spectrum. Suppose that the hospital staff had completely forgotten to 
obtain any permission whatsoever and then performed an autopsy without any 
knowledge of the parents’ wishes. The hospital’s failure to obtain any level of 
permission (as opposed to obtaining permission and then exceeding its scope) 
would likely be a mere negligent oversight. This omission would be similar to the 
selection of an inadequate casket in Hackett.31 Had the hospital not sought 
permission at all but rather performed the autopsy mistakenly believing that 
consent had been obtained, such conduct would likely give rise to no recovery 
under the Hackett logic, for it would not rise to the level of intentionality required 
by Papieves.32 
2. Negligence Spectrum: Medium Level of Culpability 
At the medium level of culpability on the negligence spectrum is the case of 
Whitson v. City of Philadelphia, where a court in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that there was no cause of action for negligent abuse of a corpse 
under Pennsylvania law.33 In Whitson, the medical examiner of the City of 
Philadelphia failed to properly preserve the decedent’s body, which prevented the 
decedent’s family from having an open casket funeral.34 Yet the Whitson court 
cited Papieves for its holding that Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for 
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32 Id. at 975. 
33 Whitson v. City of Phila., No. 07-2832, 2008 WL 4739532, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2008). 
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intentional abuse of a corpse but not for mere negligence.35 In contrast to the 
selection of a casket in Hackett, the conduct in Whitson lies at the medium level of 
negligence because the negligence directly impacted the body.36 Under neither the 
lowest nor the medium level of culpability may recovery be awarded because the 
conduct does not rise to the intentional level. 
3. Negligence Spectrum: Highest Level of Culpability 
At the highest level of the negligence spectrum, let us imagine another 
hypothetical. Suppose that a funeral director is hired to provide embalming services 
and a casket for a family’s decedent. The funeral director has a good reputation in 
the community for his compassionate work, so the family was comfortable with 
this choice. Yet through inadvertence and inattention, the funeral director 
mistakenly cremates the body instead of preparing it for an open-casket viewing. 
The family arrives for the proceedings, only to be handed an urn containing their 
loved one’s ashes. Though apologetic, the hypothetical funeral director would face 
no civil liability in Pennsylvania, for he did not act intentionally or wantonly 
towards the body; he just made a negligent mistake—albeit a grave one.37 Such a 
catastrophic error still escapes liability since it did not come with the requisite 
intentionality. This conduct is at a higher level of culpability than Whitson because 
not only did it impact the body directly, but it also involved a complicated, time-
consuming procedure that was performed directly on the body. 
* * * 
Let us return to the hypothetical at the beginning of this discussion. The 
hospital staff’s conduct in exceeding the scope of the autopsy cannot fairly be 
compared to the intentionally egregious act of burying a body to hide it, as in 
Papieves, so the hypothetical would lie somewhere within the negligence 
spectrum.38 The hypothetical would likely lie in the middle of the negligence 
spectrum. Exceeding the scope of permission in the autopsy seems more egregious 
than the innocent mistake of selecting the wrong type of casket in Hackett. 
Remember that although Hackett lies at the lowest level on the negligence 
spectrum, the hospital staff in the hypothetical actively sought permission from the 
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36 Cf. Kearney v. City of Phila., 616 A.2d 72, 73–74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (denying recovery at the 
lowest level of negligence where medical examiner’s office delayed notifying the decedent’s relatives, 
thereby causing emotional distress but no physical harm to the body). 
37 See Hackett, 528 A.2d at 975. 
38 Papieves, 263 A.2d at 119. 
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decedent’s parents and then exceeded it, causing injury to the body directly, as 
opposed to injuring another medium which then injured the body.39 
The greatest danger under the current holdings is that damages are prohibited 
for abuse that does not rise to the outrageous or intentional level.40 Regardless of 
the level of culpability in the actor’s negligence, there will be zero recovery for the 
decedent’s family as long as the actor does not act intentionally. While it is perhaps 
true that miniscule amounts of misconduct at the low end of the negligence 
spectrum should not afford recovery, the problem with the current approach is that 
it blocks recovery at all places along the spectrum—including the most egregious 
levels of negligence. It would be more proper to open the door to recovery for 
negligence and then to award damages based upon the actual misconduct. Thus, 
Pennsylvania should adopt § 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
allows for recovery in instances of negligent conduct where one “removes, 
withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a dead person or prevents its 
proper interment or cremation.”41 
II. PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR NEGLIGENT ABUSE OF A CORPSE 
A. Other States Already Allow Recovery for Negligent Abuse of 
a Corpse 
If Pennsylvania were to allow recovery for negligent abuse of a corpse, it 
would not be adopting a radical approach. Instead, Pennsylvania would be joining a 
growing contingent of states that already allow such recovery. 
1. Texas 
Texas has long recognized a cause of action for negligent abuse of a corpse.42 In 
Missouri v. Hawkins, the parents of a deceased infant shipped the body on a train car 
to the location where burial would take place.43 The parents had placed the body in a 
casket and then placed the casket into a plain wooden box, which they nailed shut and 
labeled to indicate that a body was inside.44 A railroad employee mistakenly stood the 
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43 Id. at 222. 
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box up on one end, and the box fell down and came open.45 The body sustained 
bruising, particularly in the face region, to such an extent that the family could not get 
the decedent’s eyes to remain shut.46 The court allowed the family to recover for their 
emotional “injuries to the feelings” that resulted from the defendant’s conduct, but the 
court did not allow recovery for the delay in burial caused by the damage to the 
body.47 (However, in a later case, the Texas court allowed a decedent’s family to 
recover for their inconvenience in having to delay funeral services for eight hours 
when a shipping company failed to timely deliver the body for burial.48) 
Hawkins49 is analogous to Pennsylvania’s Hackett50 case in that both involve 
the negligent transport of a decedent. Hawkins is likely closer to the medium level 
of culpability like Pennsylvania’s Whitson51 case because the negligence directly 
involved the casket containing the body, as opposed to negligence in the selection 
of that casket in Hackett.52 The Texas approach would allow for recovery at the 
Whitson53 medium level of culpability and presumably also at the highest level of 
negligent culpability along the negligence spectrum. 
2. Ohio 
Ohio courts have held that 
[t]he policy of the law to protect the dead and preserve the sanctity of the grave 
comes down to us from ancient times, having its more immediate origin in the 
ecclesiastical law. This salutary rule recognizes the tender sentiments uniformly 
found in the hearts of men, the natural desire that there be repose and reverence 
for the dead, and the sanctity of the sepulcher.54 
                                                           
 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 223. 
47 Id. at 224. 
48 Lancaster v. Mebane, 247 S.W. 926, 927–28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). 
49 Hawkins, 109 S.W. at 222. 
50 Hackett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
51 Whitson v. City of Phila, No. 07-2832, 2008 WL 4739532, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2008). 
52 Hackett, 528 A.2d at 972. 
53 Whitson, 2008 WL 4739532, at *1. 
54 Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (citing Brownlee v. 
Pratt, 68 N.E.2d 798, 800–01 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946)). 
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In Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, the relatives of a decedent whose remains 
were unearthed by a cemetery backhoe operator brought a claim based on negligent 
abuse.55 The backhoe had struck the side and top of a rough box, which contained a 
coffin with the body of the family’s decedent.56 The court noted that other courts 
have established a quasi-property right to the custody of a body, to ensure that it be 
treated with decency and respect.57 Yet “‘[q]uasi property’ seems to be, however, 
simply another convenient ‘hook’ upon which liability is hung[]—merely a phrase 
covering up and concealing the real basis for damages, which is mental anguish.”58 
The court thus rejected the theory that a surviving custodian has quasi-property 
rights in the body of the deceased and instead acknowledged that the cause of 
action for mishandling a dead body sounds in tort, specifically infliction of 
emotional distress.59 
In the case of Frys v. Cleveland, the family of a decedent brought a claim for 
their emotional distress arising out of a cemetery’s conduct in burying the decedent 
in a temporary location until the body could be buried in its permanent spot.60 A 
vault near the decedent’s intended spot had encroached into the space, requiring 
unexpected work that was impractical given the inclement weather conditions.61 
There was some dispute as to whether the family was aware that the initial spot 
would be temporary, for the case centered around the emotional distress the 
plaintiff incurred while attending the second burial in the permanent location.62 The 
plaintiff was distressed by the muddy conditions that resulted from the backhoe 
tracks from the temporary spot to the permanent location and felt tense and upset 
afterwards.63 The plaintiff ultimately lost her claim, though not because Ohio law 
did not allow for recovery. Rather, she could not demonstrate that her emotional 
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56 Id. 
57 Id. at 434. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 435. 
60 Frys v. City of Cleveland, 668 N.E.2d 929, 930–31 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
61 Id. at 930. 
62 Id. at 930–31. 
63 Id. at 931. 
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injuries were “serious and reasonably foreseeable.”64 Ohio law would have allowed 
recovery for emotional injuries that were serious and reasonably foreseeable.65 
When applied to the hypothetical that started this paper, Ohio would likely 
allow the couple to recover for their emotional distress arising from the abuse of 
their child’s body. While the parents may not have a “property right” to the body of 
their child, these Ohio courts have acknowledged that there are still legitimate 
interests in this arena that require protection due to their sensitive nature. 
3. Hawaii 
In the case of Guth v. Freeland, a decedent’s body was not properly 
refrigerated by a morgue inside a hospital.66 The decedent’s family had contracted 
with a funeral director, who went to retrieve the body from the hospital’s morgue, 
only to find that the body had been kept outside the refrigeration unit.67 The body 
was bloated and already partially decomposed.68 The face was purple, the eyes 
were bulging, the veins were black, and the tongue was swollen and protruding.69 
The body also smelled terrible and was deemed a “hazzard [sic] to health” by the 
funeral director.70 The funeral director then immediately embalmed the body, 
which prevented further decay, though without altering the appearance of the 
body.71 The family was told that the desired open-casket funeral could not be held 
due to the body’s condition.72 The family did not appear to understand what this 
meant, so they were shown the body and immediately suffered emotional distress 
as a result.73 Notably, none of the plaintiffs suffered any physical injuries.74 
                                                           
 
64 Id. at 932. 
65 Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 767 (Ohio 1983). 
66 Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 983 (Haw. 2001). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 984. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged, among other things, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.75 The court examined Hawaii Revised Statute § 663-8.9, which 
disallows recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress arising out of 
damage to property without a corresponding physical injury.76 The court noted that 
it “would question the policy behind recognizing the value of an attachment to 
material possessions.”77 Yet the court held that, in this case, the body was not a 
material possession.78 The court cited commentaries explaining that, in the case of 
corpses, there is “an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, 
arising from special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is 
spurious. . . . Where the guarantee can be found, and the mental distress is 
undoubtedly real and serious, there may be no good reason to deny recovery.”79 
That is, it is unlikely that there will be frivolous emotional distress claims when the 
damaged object is a corpse.80 Further, the court noted that in many cases involving 
the negligent abuse of a corpse, the defendants are in a better position than the 
decedent’s relatives to prevent such abuse and to pay for such damages.81 
Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court expressly recognized that it was allowing 
recovery even though the tortfeasor owed no direct duty to the decedent, who 
himself is not harmed by the negligent actions.82 Yet despite this lack of a direct 
duty, 
                                                           
 
75 Id. 
76 The Hawaii Statute provides that: 
(a) No party shall be liable for the negligent infliction of serious emotional 
distress or disturbance if the distress or disturbance arises solely out of 
damage to property or material objects. 
(b) This section shall not apply if the serious emotional distress or 
disturbance results in physical injury to or mental illness of the person who 
experiences the emotional distress or disturbance. 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.9 (1995). 
77 Guth, 28 P.3d at 987 (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 523 (Haw. 1970) (emphasis added)). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 362 (5th 
ed. 1984) (emphasis added)). 
80 See id. at 988. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 989. 
P E N N S Y L V A N I A  P O S T - M O R T E M  R I G H T S   
 
P A G E  |  4 3 5   
 
As a society we want those who are entrusted with the bodies of our dead to 
exercise the greatest of care. Imposing liability . . . will promote that goal. 
Further, those who come in contact with the bereaved should show the greatest 
solicitude; it is beyond a simple business relationship—they have assumed a 
position of special trust toward the family. Few among us who have felt the sting 
of death cannot appreciate the grief of those bereaved by the loss. It is neither 
unreasonable nor unfair to expect the same appreciation by those who prepare 
our dead.83 
Finally, the court recognized a way of limiting the class of potential plaintiffs, 
which is necessary since there will oftentimes be unforeseeable plaintiffs to whom 
the tortfeasor did not owe a direct duty.84 Therefore, the court limited recovery to 
immediate family members “or any other person who in fact occupies an equivalent 
status.”85 
This Hawaii case arguably lies within the highest level of culpability on the 
negligence spectrum, for the damage to the body and emotional distress to the 
family were both great. The public policies enunciated in Guth are also applicable 
to the hypothetical discussed in the “highest level of culpability” section, for the 
“position of special trust” held by the hypothetical funeral director who mistakenly 
cremates the body is sufficient to impose liability on him.86 
B. The Victim’s Family Has Suffered Enough from the Abuse, 
So the Tortfeasor Should Be the One to Pay for the Damages 
of the Abuse 
We must realize that somebody will suffer a loss in a situation where there is 
negligent abuse of a corpse, and there are two possibilities as to who pays for these 
costs. In the first option, the person who abuses a corpse will pay no damages to the 
decedent’s family. The decedent’s heirs will suffer emotional distress and damage 
to their loved one’s body while recovering nothing for these damages. The number 
and duration of the tortfeasor’s negligent acts could be limitless, because unless 
and until his or her conduct rises to the level of intentionality required by the 
current state of Pennsylvania law, there can be no recovery whatsoever for the 
                                                           
 
83 Id. at 989 (quoting Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co., 261 Cal. Rptr. 769, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
84 Guth, 28 P.3d at 990. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 989–90. 
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victim’s family.87 That is, as long as the actor remains merely careless and 
inadvertent—and not intentional, outrageous, or wanton—he is free to act 
negligently until the cows come home.88 
In the second option, upon proving the four traditional elements of a 
negligence action, the decedent’s heirs will be able to recover from the negligent 
tortfeasor for damages the tortfeasor caused to the decedent’s body. In every other 
area of life, the law requires that a negligent tortfeasor—not the innocent victim—
pay for the damages he caused, so why should it be any different when the damages 
were to a dead body?89 Given that somebody has to suffer the loss, it seems far 
more appropriate to require the bad actor to bear that burden than the innocent 
victim’s family. To hold otherwise would create a windfall to the negligent 
tortfeasor, for he could freely act negligently without paying any damages, which is 
conduct the law ought to discourage. Now it is true that in some situations of 
“negligence in the air,” a tortfeasor ends up not paying anything despite acting 
negligently. These are situations where there is negligent conduct but no actual 
harm suffered. Negligent abuse of a corpse, on the other hand, is not such an “in 
the air” situation, for there is negligent conduct and harm, so it is not a type of 
conduct which the law has routinely excused. 
C. There Is No Logical Justification for Barring Recovery for 
Negligent Abuse 
Pennsylvania courts have not yet articulated a justification for barring 
recovery for negligent abuse, aside from the fact that Papieves requires the abuse to 
be intentional, outrageous, or wanton for there to be recovery.90 One possible 
justification could be that damage is not actually done to the plaintiff—the one 
actually bringing the action in court—but rather to the decedent’s body. That is, the 
plaintiff himself suffered no actual harm, as opposed to a situation in which the 
plaintiff suffered injuries to his person or damages to his own property. While this 
is true in actions for negligent abuse of a corpse, this rationale ignores the 
multiplicity of actions that are routinely brought on another’s behalf. The 
Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly provides that certain actions survive beyond 
                                                           
 
87 Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 A.2d 118, 120–21 (Pa. 1970). 
88 Hackett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. Super. Ct 1987) (discussing Papieves, 263 A.2d 
118). 
89 See G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1133–34 (Pa. 1998) (Flaherty, C.J., dissenting) (discussing 
how a plaintiff’s interest in compensatory damages vests at the time the harm occurs). 
90 Papieves, 263 A.2d at 122. 
P E N N S Y L V A N I A  P O S T - M O R T E M  R I G H T S   
 
P A G E  |  4 3 7   
 
the victim’s death.91 “Survival actions” and “wrongful death” suits are, by 
definition, brought by a decedent’s heirs.92 In fact, there is specific statutory 
authority behind such actions in the Wrongful Death93 and Survival Acts.94 
Moreover, parents bring actions on behalf of their minor children (who own the 
cause of action) on a regular basis.95 Thus, just because the thing that is physically 
injured by negligent abuse (i.e., the decedent’s body) is not the one handling the 
litigation should not be dispositive, for there are many other situations in which the 
party in court is not the person who was actually injured. 
The basic rationale the Hackett court used for denying recovery was that such 
recovery had not been allowed before.96 Yet America is a nation that was built 
upon the idea that change should be sought when needed,97 and the need for change 
has continually developed this nation into what it has become.98 In the arts, it has 
often been the case that musical compositions took years to garner acceptance, but 
                                                           
 
91 PA. CONST. art. III, § 18. 
92 See Walker v. Roney, 595 A.2d 1318, 1319–20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
93 42 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8301 (2006). 
94 Id. § 8302. 
95 See, e.g., Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 761 A.2d 1159 (Pa. 2000). 
96 Hackett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
97 This willingness is alluded to in the Declaration of Independence itself: 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not 
be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath 
shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, 
than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are 
accustomed.  But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing 
inevitably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute 
Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and 
to provide new Guards for their future security. 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
98 There was a time, not that long ago, when blacks and whites were lawfully segregated in areas of 
public accommodation. Courts used to uphold and endorse these differences. At one point, the United 
States Supreme Court held that 
[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and 
colored races—a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, 
and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the 
other race by color—has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two 
races. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896). 
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once they did, these pieces remain among the most beloved in the repertoire—to 
such an extent that one could wonder what we ever did without them.99 Where 
would we as a society be if amputation was the primary cure for an infected toe, or 
if polio vaccinations were undesirable since they had never been given before? In 
fact, the Papieves court itself noted that “[e]very cause of action in tort . . . was 
once a novel claim.”100 Thus, Pennsylvania courts should not fear establishing a 
new cause of action based on these grounds, for all claims were once new. 
It is true that the possibility of opening the floodgates to litigation is often 
cited as a reason for not recognizing a new cause of action, based on the fact that 
the courts would become inundated.101 This is especially a danger when a new 
cause of action would create negative repercussions on society at large, such as 
higher insurance costs, for example.102 Thankfully, there is not a widespread 
pandemic of corpse abuse occurring in modern society, so it is unlikely that there 
will be a stampede of plaintiffs bringing causes of action for the negligent abuse of 
their deceased relative. Instead, opening the door to recovery for negligent abuse 
would affect only a small number of persons—the deceased’s family, who need 
that door open the most. This cause of action would also promote public policies 
behind increasing our appreciation for the dead. 
D. The Current State of the Law Creates a “Reverse Eggshell 
Skull Rule” 
Adopting § 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts would bring 
Pennsylvania law, with respect to the deceased, into compliance with traditional 
negligence maxims—that one who owes a duty, breaches that duty, and whose 
breach was the proximate cause of another’s damages, must pay for those 
damages.103 Negligence, by definition, “is not an intentional tort,”104 and 
                                                           
 
99 When Igor Stravinsky’s ballet The Rite of Spring premiered in 1913, its unprecedented style of 
musical dissonances—deemed “one of the greatest creative leaps in not only the history of music, but in 
the history of the arts”—was met with such resistance that the concertgoers took to rioting in the streets. 
Yet today, The Rite of Spring is one of the staples of the standard repertoire. See Renee Montagne, 
Stravinsky’s Riotous “Rite of Spring,” NPR (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=88490677. 
100 Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 A.2d 118, 120 (Pa. 1970). 
101 Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ark. 1985). 
102 Id. 
103 Montagazzi v. Crisci, 994 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
104 Erie Ins. Exch. v. Muff, 851 A.2d 919, 932–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
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negligence actions can produce damages for nearly every kind of loss.105 Whether 
the injury is in the form of a physical injury to a person or merely against 
impersonal property is irrelevant, because the elements of negligence do not 
distinguish between the two.106 As long as a plaintiff can meet the four elements, he 
or she may recover in a negligence action.107 
Tort law also recognizes the “eggshell skull” rule, stating that a tortfeasor 
must take his victim as he finds him and must pay for all damages actually 
incurred, even if those damages exceed the tortfeasor’s original expectations.108 For 
instance, if a tortfeasor strikes a person and injures the victim’s index finger, only 
to discover that the victim is a renowned concert pianist who is now unable to play 
the piano, the unlucky tortfeasor will be liable for an extraordinary amount of lost 
wages. Yet under the current state of the law, a tortfeasor who negligently damages 
a corpse lucks out because his actions harmed a dead body, as opposed to a living 
being. 
Similarly, tort law routinely requires a tortfeasor to repair damaged 
property.109 The victim may recover for damages to restore his property to the pre-
injured condition.110 Suppose that a pedestrian is struck by a vehicle and is carrying 
a black bag. If there is a sack of flour in the bag and it is destroyed, then the victim 
will recover only for his destroyed sack of flour.111 Likewise, if there is a $30,000 
                                                           
 
105 See, e.g., Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 459–60 (Pa. 1998) (negligence action for property damage 
to a motor vehicle in an automobile accident); Burnside v. Abbott Labs., 505 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1985) (negligence action for personal injuries resulting from the ingestion of harmful substances in 
pharmaceutical drugs); Siegel v. Struble Bros., 28 A.2d 352, 353–54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (negligence 
action for damages to a house that resulted from excessive steam arising from the installation of a faulty 
heating system); Helenthal v. Geller, 13 Pa. D. & C. 329, 329–30 (C.P. Lancaster 1929) (negligence 
action involving damage to the plaintiff’s flowers and plants). 
106 See cases cited supra note 105. 
107 Montagazzi, 994 A.2d at 631. 
108 Meyer v. Union R.R., 865 A.2d 857, 863 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (recognizing the “eggshell skull” 
rule). 
109 See Siegel, 28 A.2d at 355 (tortfeasor required to pay damages to return a damaged house to its 
original condition); cf. Hackett v. United Airlines, 528 A.2d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (tortfeasor 
paid nothing for damaging a corpse). 
110 See Harvey v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 50 A. 770, 771 (Pa. 1902) (measure of recovery is the cost of 
restoring property to its original condition prior to the injury). 
111 At Wal-Mart in Western Pennsylvania on September 28, 2011, a five-pound bag of Great Value 
brand all-purpose, bleached, enriched, and pre-sifted flour cost $1.94. 
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ceramic sculpture in the bag, the victim may recover for the damaged sculpture.112 
Yet if there is a body in the bag, there can currently be absolutely no recovery for 
damage to the body.113 
In the case of the ceramic sculpture, the tortfeasor would be sickened to learn 
that he is now liable for $30,000 in damages, based on the fact that the tortfeasor 
must restore the damaged property to its pre-injury condition.114 In the case of the 
groceries, the tortfeasor is delighted to learn that there was only a sack of flour in 
the bag, such that the damages are only nominal. Yet if the damaged item is a body, 
the tortfeasor owes nothing, and he is less liable than he would be if he had 
damaged a sack of flour.115 While tortfeasors will occasionally luck out a little bit 
by becoming liable for only small damages in certain cases, they will luck out 
entirely if the only thing they damage is the body of a decedent. The miracle of life 
and the most basic principles of humanity mandate that human beings receive more 
protection than any other item which the law strives to protect. In particular, the 
deceased remains of a relative deserve more protection than a sack of flour. 
Because tort law allows for the full recovery of damages under the eggshell skull 
rule, it is axiomatic that the courts have taken an opposite position when it comes to 
damage to a corpse. 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to the hypothetical that began this paper, it has been shown that 
Pennsylvania would side with the tortfeasor and award the family no damages for 
their loss. As long as the tortfeasor’s conduct remains within the negligence realm 
and does not rise to the level of being outrageous, intentional, or wanton, no 
recovery will be awarded. As the negligence spectrum has shown, this approach is 
problematic because it does not allow for recovery in situations involving the most 
egregious types of negligence. It would make far more sense to allow the victim of 
minimal negligence to receive nominal recovery, the victim of moderate negligence 
to recover moderate recovery, and the victim of outrageous misconduct to continue 
                                                           
 
112 See Harvey, 50 A. at 771 (measure of recovery is the cost of restoring property to its original 
condition prior to the injury). 
113 Hackett, 528 A.2d at 975. I will not speculate as to why a person might be carrying a body around in 
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law. 
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recovering damages within the intentional realm. Unfortunately, under the current 
state of Pennsylvania law, only the victim of outrageous conduct will receive 
anything; the others will not receive a dime. 
This approach would be justifiable if there were an articulated and logical 
reason for it. But Pennsylvania has rested on the precedent that it simply has not 
done so before. This contradicts the law’s approach to all other types of negligent 
conduct, wherein the tortfeasor pays for the damages he causes. It also forces the 
innocent victims of negligent abuse to suffer the costs of damages that they had no 
part in creating and essentially awards windfalls to negligent actors. Further, 
Pennsylvania has continually resisted the trend adopted by a growing number of 
other states. 
While the hypothetical examples may be criticized as being far-fetched or 
extreme, the results under the current state of the law remain absolutely true. Until 
the Pennsylvania courts alter the current approach, the families described 
throughout this note will inevitably go from being hypothetical discussions to real-
world tragedies. 
